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Dear Professor Furman, 
 
We wish to submit the revisions to our paper titled ‘Bridging Neural and 
Computational Viewpoints on Perceptual Decision Making’. 
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agree and look forward to hearing your decision in due course. 
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Redmond O’Connell, Michael Shadlen, Kongfatt Wong-Lin & Simon Kelly 
 
 
 
Cover Letter
Response to Reviewer Comments 
 
We are most grateful to the editor and reviewers for their excellent comments which we 
feel have resulted in a much improved manuscript. We have responded to each of the 
reviewer comments in turn below. Amendments to the manuscript have been highlighted 
in blue font.  
 
In general, I liked reading the manuscript. It's well written and important topics are 
highlighted and discussed from a fair perspective. I pretty much agreed with the all of the 
perspectives within, and so I have little to add for the review process.  
 
I'm not sure if there is a limit on the references or what, but I did feel like the paper could 
connect to efforts coming from mathematical psychology, and not only neuroscience, to link 
these two streams of evidence. There are also already many reviews on strategies for 
linking, as well as whether the general philosophy is even warranted. For example, Schall 
(2003; Annual Reviews of Psychology) discusses the linking proposition at length, and Turner 
et al. (2017; Journal of Math. Psych.) discuss different statistical and mathematical 
strategies for relating the two measures. 
 
We thank the reviewer for highlighting these excellent and highly relevant reviews which 
we have now cited repeatedly in the revised manuscript. The comments of both reviewers 
have highlighted to us that the opening sections of the original manuscript were 
somewhat ambiguous regarding the specific aims of our review and may have given the 
impression that we were intending to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the different 
approaches to integrating mathematical models with neural data. In reality our goal was 
to focus more specifically on two key emerging themes in the recent literature on 
perceptual decision making: A) the use of neural activity measurements to directly inform 
abstract mathematical models and hence resolve important theoretical debates in the 
literature and B) the increasing evidence that even elementary perceptual decisions 
involve numerous processing stages and the challenge this poses when seeking to infer 
decision computations from neural data. We now make our intentions much clearer in our 
revised title, abstract and opening paragraphs.  
 
The authors also have a very narrow focus on the urgency interpretation of neural data 
based on their own work, but there are other mathematical models that explain the 
asymptotic properties of accuracy based on lateral inhibition and leakage, and recently the 
dynamics of lateral inhibition have been shown to correlate with frontal areas often 
engaged in cognitive control in humans (Turner et al., 2018; Cerebral Cortex).  
 
Response to Reviewers
Indeed, the inclusion of lateral inhibition and leakage in the leaky competing accumulator 
(LCA) model can account for the fact that accuracy reaches asymptotic levels as stimulus 
durations increase. However, we are not aware of any work in which it has been shown 
that the LCA can account for a decline in choice accuracy with increasing reaction time for 
a fixed stimulus duration - the key behavioural feature at play in the debate concerning 
the role of dynamic bound adjustments. Moreover, it is not clear to us how lateral 
inhibition and leakage could account for the evidence-independent component of build-
up in motor preparation circuits observed in recent monkey (e.g. Hanks et al 2014) and 
human (Murphy et al 2016) studies. To provide a broader coverage of the literature, we 
have added additional discussion of Heitz and Schall’s (2012) investigation of neural 
adjustments to speed/accuracy emphasis in the context of visual search (pages 9 and 10) 
which highlighted a distinct pattern of adjustments to those observed by Hanks et al 
(2014) and necessitated the development of a new biophysically-inspired model in order 
to reconcile the behavioural and neural data within a sequential sampling framework.  
 
There is also a paper at Psych. Review by Purcell et al (2010) that uses single unit data as 
direct input to suites of accumulator models, and another one at Journal of Neuroscience in 
2012. These explanations use gating as the main force, but one can imagine that predictions 
from gating models could look a lot like an urgency signal if the gate were not discrete but 
instead allowed for a gradual build up through time. Finally, there are some connections 
they could make to an optimal model of decision making that explains why bounds should 
collapse (Malhotra et al. 2017; PB&R), and another neuroimaging study that further 
identifies other neural bases of a time-varying boundary policy (van Maanen et al. 2016; 
NeuroImage). 
 
Again we thank the reviewer for orienting us to these excellent papers which are clearly 
relevant to our discussion and which we have now cited in the revised manuscript. With 
respect to Purcell et al’s work, these authors have demonstrated that visual search 
performance is well explained by a model in which the onset of evidence accumulation is 
regulated via gated inhibition. Increasing the level of the ‘gate’ is beneficial for choice 
accuracy in this context because it ensures that sensory evidence signals (salience 
encoding visual FEF neurons) are at a higher resolution by the time they begin to drive the 
accumulation process. In their 2012 J Neurosci paper, Purcell et al  further showed that 
systematic adjustments to this gating parameter yielded speed-accuracy tradeoffs in 
choice behaviour that are analogous to those associated with static bound adjustments 
i.e.  increased gating (or bound) leads to slower RT and higher accuracy. As far as we can 
deduce, a gradual opening of the gate would lead to the prediction of a progressive 
increase in the influence of sensory evidence on decision signal build-up over time, yet the 
urgency components identified in neurophysiological studies to date have been 
demonstrably evidence-independent. Thus, we cannot quite conceive of how a dynamic 
gate adjustment could account for diminishing accuracy as a function of RT or the 
observation of time-dependent urgency signals in motor-preparation circuits.  
 
We thank the reviewer for orienting us to Malhotra et al’s paper which indeed provides an 
important demonstration that the optimality of dynamic bound adjustments varies as a 
function of task demands (page 3).  
 
Reviewer 2  
1. The title of the review is somewhat misleading, as it suggests that the authors will present 
a broad perspective on decision making. In fact, they restrict themselves to the 
consideration of sequential sampling models. There is nothing wrong with this, but as things 
stand, the more specific focus of the article should be clearly flagged up. 
 
In retrospect we agree that our original title was too general and should have made 
specific reference to our focus on ‘perceptual’ decisions. Given this theme it is logical that 
we focus almost entirely on sequential sampling models since these are by some distance 
the most commonly implemented and most influential models in the field of perceptual 
decision making.   
 
2. Similarly, there is an ambiguity in the purpose of the article. Are the authors aiming to 
specifically discuss work on sequential sampling models, or just use sequential sampling 
models as an example for broader points. If the former, I would expect to see more 
discussion of sequential sampling models, in particular, how plausible they are as 
psychological process theories. If the latter, then I would suggest that the paper includes 
more discussion of broad conceptual points, and the specific details of the literature on 
sequential sampling are reserved to illustrate specific points. 
 
We have now made changes throughout the manuscript, including completely rewriting 
the Abstract, to make it clear that the focus of this review is on efforts to leverage neural 
data in resolving major theoretical debates that have arisen in the recent literature on 
perceptual decision making. While our review certainly touches on themes that are 
relevant to many domains of cognitive neuroscience, sequential sampling models have 
provided the dominant theoretical framework guiding research on perceptual decision 
making and therefore take center stage in the most prominent studies and debates in this 
field.  As the reviewer alludes to here and in the next comment, our review brings up 
important questions about how we compare data across distinct levels of analysis i.e. 
refining psychological process models by testing the unique predictions they make for the 
neural implementation of those processes. We have added more discussion of these 
considerations to the revised manuscript (e.g. pages 4 and 5). We have also oriented the 
reader to recent reviews that comprehensively examine sequential sampling models and 
their plausibility as psychological process theories (Ratcliff et al 2016, TICS; Forstmann et 
al 2016, Ann Revs Psychol). 
 
 
3. A key point, which the authors mention but don't further explore, is the status of the 
models being used. Sequential sampling models could be considered a 'process theory' at a 
psychological level, but it is far from clear how they would be instantiated neurally. This 
motivates the search for neural correlates of aspects of this model, which the authors 
describe, but it also necessitates the search for neurobiological process models that 
implement sequential sampling. (This point could also be framed in terms of Marrian levels) 
I am surprised to see this second point given relatively little prominence in the article, being 
largely relegated to Box 4. This isn't a trivial point, without candidate neural process models, 
it can be difficult to confidently interpret the significance of the neural correlates of (for 
example) urgency signals. (I would recommend looking at Laurence Hunt's thoughtful 2014 
TiCS piece) None of these concerns are fatal to the points the authors are trying to make, 
but they do provide an important context. 
 
We are grateful to the reviewer for raising this very important point. We have now made 
several changes to the main text in order to highlight the pivotal role that biophysically-
grounded neural process models have played in establishing the plausible circuit 
configurations and settings that can support computations such as temporal integration 
and in interpreting empirical observations of decision-relevant neural dynamics (e.g. 
pages 9 and 10). We have also highlighted the importance of bridging between abstract 
models and these biophysically grounded neural models (pages 4, 5, 9 and 10).  
 
4. I was surprised not to see discussion of recent work by Jonathan Pillow, Carlos Brody, and 
others that have called into question the LIP-as-evidence-accumulation story. It is essential 
that the authors cover this challenging recent material and how it relates to their 
contentions. Chris Summerfield's work looking at EEG correlates of evidence accumulation 
might also be relevant here. 
 
Box 3 of the original submission was intended to highlight the recent LIP inactivation 
studies by Pillow, Huk and others and to examine the claim that they present a challenge 
to previous work linking activity in this region with evidence accumulation.  However, we 
failed to cite the relevant rodent work of Brody et al and the reviewer’s comment has 
highlighted to us that we may not have communicated our ideas with sufficient clarify. 
We have therefore amended the text of Box 3 and included the missing citations. 
Although these recent inactivation studies have drawn a considerable amount of 
attention, we point out that the notion that since LIP activity reflects the dynamics of 
sensory evidence accumulation, it must thus represent LIP’s core function was always 
misguided. Numerous earlier studies had already indicated that LIP inactivation has at 
best a weak impact on choice behaviour and that decision-related activity in this region is 
highly task-dependent. Nevertheless, we believe it has been convincingly demonstrated 
that, under carefully contrived circumstances, LIP neurons can provide a valuable window 
onto the neural decision process which can inform the construction of mathematical 
models.  
 
It is not clear to us whether the reviewer also has in mind Latimer/Pillow et al’s recent 
study (Latimer et al, 2015, Science) suggesting that single-trial LIP spike trains are better 
described by a statistical model involving discrete instantaneous steps and that the 
previously reported ramp-to-threshold dynamics are a byproduct of trial averaging. The 
methods employed in this study and the interpretation of results are the subject of a 
vigorous and very detailed debate (Shadlen et al 2016, Science; Latimer et al 2016, 
Science; Zylberberg et al 2016, BiorXiv; Latimer et al 2017, BiorXiv) including follow-up 
analyses that have yielded conflicting results (Zhao & Konrad, 2018, BiorXiv). However, 
Latimer et al themselves argue that their findings should not be taken as a rejection of the 
larger LIP accumulation-to-bound model but, rather, serve to highlight the gaps in our 
understanding of the relations between the functional properties of individual cells and 
the resulting circuit dynamics (Latimer et al 2017, BioRxiv). Even if correct, the idea that 
individual neurons might step instead of ramping is not at odds with the view that the 
brain implements evidence accumulation processes for making perceptual decisions or 
that trial- and population-averaged LIP activity can offer a window onto these processes. 
Thus, while highly interesting, Latimer et al’s findings do not pose any obvious challenges 
to the overarching message of our review that decision-related neural activity 
measurements - not just from LIP but potentially from any recording established to reflect 
dynamics of decision formation - can be fruitfully used to inform abstract cognitive 
models. For this reason, due to space restrictions and because Latimer et al’s study has 
already been extensively discussed and reviewed (Hanks & Summerfield, 2017) elsewhere, 
we have opted not to cover this particular study/debate in our revision.  
 
We thank the reviewer for highlighting the EEG work of Summerfield et al, which we have 
cited in Box 2.  
 
 
5. In places there is too much focus on the details of particular studies for a TiNS article (e.g. 
the paragraph from L123 - 140) 
 
We have made amendments to the text in order to reduce the time spent on any single 
study. We understand that, having given the impression that our intention was to provide 
broad coverage of the literature on decision making, we appeared to spend an excessive 
amount of text discussing the paper by Hawkins et al. However, as we hope we have 
clarified in our responses above and in our changes to the manuscript, our focus is very 
much on perceptual decision making and efforts to draw correspondences between 
sequential sampling models and neural activity measurements. This highly influential 
paper by Hawkins et al provides an excellent illustration of the limitations of developing 
models based purely on fits to behavioural data and we feel this can only be conveyed to 
the general reader by laying out the details of the study and, most importantly, how the 
model comparisons were conducted. We have sought to articulate this more clearly 
through amendments to the text.  
 
6. The discussion of model comparison in the text is somewhat unclear. By definition, 
Bayesian model comparison gives us our best guess about the model (and therefore the 
mechanisms) that generated the data. Clearly there are limitations to this - we may not have 
the right models, the right priors, the right (or enough) data, but these are limitations of our 
knowledge and experiments, not model comparison as such. If the point that the authors 
want to make here is (as I take it to be) that behavioural model comparison can only take us 
so far, then this needs to be discussed more fully. 
 
Yes, the reviewer is correct that our intention is to argue that behavioural model 
comparisons can only take us so far. We certainly did not mean to suggest that Bayesian 
tests are not a good approach to model comparisons in general. We have amended the 
text in order to articulate this important point more clearly.  
 
7. Related to the above point, there are other areas in which neural data may be essential 
for adjudicating between behavioural models. (A lot of neuroeconomics, for example, can 
be seen in this light.) The authors might want to consider discussing these parallels with 
other areas. 
 
We thank the reviewer for this suggestion.  Indeed, given the increasing trend toward 
integrating computational models with neural data across the cognitive neurosciences, 
our review touches on conceptual and methodological issues that transcend the literature 
on perceptual decision making. Although the space limitations preclude a thorough 
discussion of the parallels, we took the opportunity to at least highlight this general point 
and to orient the reader to a couple of excellent recent examples from the 
neuroeconomics and object categorisation literature (page 11).  
 
8. The paper would be improved by the addition of a figure or two illustrating different 
approaches to relating cognitive and neuronal models/data. 
 
We thank the reviewer for this suggestion. We have now included two figures in the 
manuscript. Figure 1 illustrates the dominant approaches to accounting for slow errors in 
behavioural models of perceptual decision making. Figure 2 illustrates neural observations 
from rodents, monkeys and humans which highlight the parallelism and multi-tiered 
nature of the brain’s decision making architecture. 
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Abstract 
Sequential sampling models have provided the dominant theoretical framework guiding 
computational and neurophysiological investigations of perceptual decision making. While 
these models share the basic principle that decisions are formed by accumulating sensory 
evidence to a bound, they come in many forms which can make highly similar predictions of 
choice behaviour despite invoking fundamentally different mechanisms.  The identification of 
neural signals that reflect the core computations underpinning decision formation offers new 
avenues for empirically testing and refining major model assumptions. The goal of this review is 
to highlight recent efforts to explore these avenues and, in so doing, to consider the conceptual 
and methodological challenges that arise when seeking to infer decision computations from 
complex neural data. 
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Decision Making as a Core Component of Cognition 
The term ‘decision making’ often calls to mind scenarios such as how to vote in an election or 
which course to take in college, yet even our perception of our sensory environment relies on a 
continuous stream of elementary judgments (‘perceptual decisions’) that can be equally life 
altering (e.g. is the traffic light red or green?). In the highly complex and dynamic environment 
that we inhabit, making accurate and timely decisions is a considerable challenge for the brain 
since the information it receives is almost always to some degree unreliable. Understanding 
how the brain overcomes this problem stands to illuminate principles of computation that 
extend to a wide range of cognitive operations [1]. 
The theoretical foundations for modern research on perceptual decision making were laid 
within mathematical psychology, with the development of ‘sequential sampling’ or evidence 
accumulation (see Glossary) models [2-6]. Not only do the models have a long history of 
successfully accounting for choice behaviour in a wide range of contexts, but the core 
computations that they specify appear to be mirrored in certain components of neural activity 
in the rodent [7], monkey [8, 9] and human brain [10]. Consequently, recent years have 
witnessed a growth and confluence in research efforts to identify the computations through 
which perceptual decisions are formed as well as to map, measure and manipulate the neural 
structures and processes through which they are implemented, all anchored to the framework 
of sequential sampling. An expanding repertoire of approaches to combining neural and 
computational viewpoints has emerged on the back of this movement [11]. In this review we 
shine a spotlight on recent trends in using one such approach, where neural signals known to 
reflect key aspects of bounded evidence accumulation are used to inform abstract decision 
models. We demonstrate the potential of this approach in providing strong grounds for model 
adjudication where behavioral modeling alone falls short and thus for resolving important 
theoretical debates about decision computations, and also highlight the conceptual and 
methodological challenges involved. 
 
  
Abstract Decision Models and Challenges in Model Selection 
  
Originally based on normative models for minimising the time taken to achieve a certain level 
of quality control accuracy [12], sequential sampling models provide quantitatively accurate 
accounts of behavior on a wide range of tasks including perceptual detections and 
discriminations, lexical memory, response inhibition and even social and value-based decisions 
[for comprehensive reviews see 13, 14]. This powerful class of psychological process models 
can explain both random and systematic variations in performance and decomposes choice 
reaction times and accuracy into meaningful latent parameters such as the strength of the 
evidence entering the decision process (‘drift rate’, i.e., the expectation of the evidence 
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distribution being sampled) and the cumulative quantity required to trigger commitment 
(‘decision bound’). Ongoing research based on these behavioral models continues to fruitfully 
examine how our decisions are shaped by factors such as speed pressure, value, prior 
knowledge, distracting information and brain disorders [14]. 
Many model variants exist because there are many alternative implementations of a decision 
process based on sequential sampling (Box 1). In many cases, competing model variants based 
on fundamentally different mechanisms can produce the same behavioural signature. This 
problem of model mimicry significantly hampers adjudication between competing accounts and 
has given rise to several long standing debates. To take an instructive example, a current 
ongoing debate centers on whether the criterion amount of evidence that we require to reach 
commitment can dynamically change during the course of a decision. 
In the most widely-subscribed models [13](see Box 1), although the bounds can be adjusted 
across different contexts to emphasise speed versus accuracy, in any given trial the bounds are 
assumed to be constant over time. Yet, collapsing bounds provide an optimal policy according 
to normative theory under the common situation where evidence strength varies unpredictably 
across trials and is sometimes very weak [15, 16], or where responses must be made within a 
strict deadline [15, 17]. One of the main reasons why collapsing bounds have not been 
incorporated in the dominant models is because key behavioral consequences of it, such as 
decreased accuracy for trials with longer reaction times, can be produced within a drift 
diffusion model with constant bounds via an alternative mechanism involving trial-to-trial 
variability in drift rate [13, Fig. 1]. 
Establishing the relative prominence of these alternative mechanisms in choice behavior has 
consequences far beyond matters of preference in model fitting approaches, because they 
reflect fundamentally different algorithmic elements that have important implications for our 
understanding of normal and abnormal decision making. For example, there has been an 
increasing application of sequential sampling models in studies seeking to better understand 
the decision making deficits observed in psychiatric populations [18, 19]. Establishing that 
relatively slow response times for errors in a given clinical population arise from a faster bound 
collapse (e.g. due to a more impulsive decision policy or aversion to missed deadlines) as 
opposed to greater drift rate variability (e.g. due to fluctuations in attentional engagement, see 
below for further discussion) would have very different implications both for explanatory 
accounts of the disorder and efforts to treat it. Similarly, an increasing trend in human 
neuroimaging research is to use decision model parameter estimates from behavioural data fits 
in statistical analyses to localize decision-relevant brain regions [11, 20]. Here, again, the 
particular choice of model could have major consequences both for the particular areas 
identified and the interpretation of the role they might actually play in decision formation [21].  
Behavioral model comparison approaches provide a means to identify models that strike the 
best balance between parsimony and goodness of fit. Consequently, in adjudicating between 
two model mechanisms (e.g. collapsing bound versus drift rate variability) that produce the 
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same qualitative behavioral pattern (e.g. slow errors) the choices that are made on the number 
and nature of the parameters used to implement a particular mechanism can have a major 
bearing on the outcome. For example, Hawkins et al [22] conducted formal model comparisons 
using several human and monkey datasets. Most datasets were better explained, in the sense 
of better Bayes Information Criterion (BIC), by a constant bound model with drift rate 
variability. However, in this comparison collapsing bound models also included drift rate 
variability in addition to several parameters describing the collapse (non-linear functions of 
time), thus setting them at a disadvantage since BIC metrics penalise for complexity. In an 
attempt to address this, a second main comparison was made with a collapsing bound model 
contrived to have the same number of parameters as the constant bound model. Again, the 
data favored constant bounds but the parameters that were omitted from the collapsing bound 
model were ones that account for qualitatively distinct, and often significant aspects of 
behavioral data (e.g. fast errors, distribution shape). The simplest way to implement a 
collapsing bound, i.e. a linear function of time, was not considered. A more recent study that 
did use such a linear implementation, in contrast, showed an improved BIC for a model that 
included collapsing bounds alongside drift rate variability [23]. 
 
Neurally-Informed Decision Models 
Discrepancies like the above highlight the difficulties that can arise when adjudicating between 
alternative models based on behavioral data alone. A powerful way to break such impasses is to 
additionally consider a model’s ability to capture key observable aspects of the biological 
implementation of the decision process [24-30].   Advances in both animal and human 
neurophysiology have significantly broadened the possibilities for such an approach by 
identifying signals that exhibit key dynamical characteristics of bounded evidence 
accumulation. For example, in one line of work single neurons in the monkey lateral 
intraparietal area (LIP) have been shown to exhibit highly choice-predictive activity that builds 
at a rate proportional to physical evidence strength [31, 32], linearly grows in variance as more 
evidence is sampled over time [33], and reaches a stereotyped firing level immediately prior to 
the perceptual report [34]. More recently, human electrophysiology research has established 
that signatures of bounded evidence accumulation can also be traced in global, non-invasively 
recorded signals [23, 35-37](Box 2). In parallel, empirically-grounded, biophysically-based 
models have been developed that describe plausible neural circuit configurations capable of 
implementing computations such as temporal integration [e.g. 38, 39]. The ability to observe 
neural signals reflecting decision formation is not only relevant to the construction of such 
neural network models but can also provide critical guidance in constructing, constraining and 
adjudicating between abstract, cognitive process models. Returning to our example above, 
collapsing bounds and drift rate variability, in fact, each makes specific predictions for neural 
signals relevant to decision formation, and much data already exist to examine such 
predictions. 
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 Several recent neurophysiological studies in humans and monkeys have furnished evidence 
that decision bounds are, at least in certain contexts, adjusted dynamically during decision 
formation [23, 40-43]. For example, studying motion direction decisions, Hanks et al [41] 
demonstrated that the spiking activity of neurons in area LIP, in addition to its dependence on 
direction and evidence strength, also exhibited an evidence-independent component of buildup 
for both choice alternatives, and this urgency signal rose more steeply under speed pressure 
(Fig. 1d). By imposing a progressive reduction in the quantity of evidence needed to trigger 
commitment to any of the choice alternatives, urgency signals provide a neural mechanism for 
implementing the collapsing bounds proposed in mathematical models. In addition to this 
dynamic component, Hanks et al also observed that LIP activity was elevated at the outset of 
the decision under speed pressure, consistent with an additional static component of the 
bound adjustment, and the findings of other human neuroimaging [44-46] and monkey [47] 
studies. Despite these starting point and time-dependent variations, LIP activity converged to a 
common level prior to the perceptual report. Based on these observations, a model that 
allowed for both static and dynamic adjustments to the decision bound was constructed. 
Crucially, the additional parameters describing these bound adjustments were not fit to the 
behavioural data but measured directly from neural activity, and the only parameters that were 
free to vary were ones that did not differ between the two speed pressure conditions. The 
resultant model nevertheless provided a compelling fit to the behavioural data including the 
extent of the impact of speed pressure. Although it has been suggested that such urgency 
effects may be peculiar to monkeys [13], and species differences of this nature likely do exist, 
consistent effects have recently been reported in human electrophysiological indices of motor 
preparation [23]. Alongside the growing number of empirical demonstrations of urgency and 
their increased incorporation into abstract models, new lines of research are seeking to identify 
plausible biophysical mechanisms for their generation. Neural network modelling studies have 
demonstrated the potential role of dynamic modulations of neural gain [48-50], in particular 
those mediated by neuromodulatory arousal systems [51], whose dynamic activity can be 
empirically examined via changes to pupil diameter [23].  
Drift rate variability is an undeniably convenient feature of abstract decision models for 
quantitative fitting of behavior [52] but it is seldom scrutinized in terms of possible 
neurophysiological underpinnings. The most obvious candidate underlying cause is the random 
trial-to-trial fluctuation in the mean firing rates of neurons encoding sensory evidence. In the 
context of two-alternative decisions, such fluctuations would have to take the form of random 
biases towards one alternative or the other rather than nonselective variations related to 
general arousal or task engagement, since drift rate is driven by differential evidence. Such 
fluctuations would also have to occur on the slow timescale of typical trial durations, and 
therefore should give rise to significant and broad autocorrelation in evidence-encoding 
neurons. This has been examined in several areas including monkey MT for motion decisions, 
where autocorrelation levels are, in fact, low and have short (on the order of <100 ms) 
timescales [53, 54], at least compared to higher brain areas [55]. This does not preclude 
variability in the weighting of such evidence signals as inputs to the accumulation process, and 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
6 
 
it is possible that broad fluctuations are more prominent in other sensory areas, other species 
and/or other tasks. For example, during continuous monitoring for sensory targets occurring at 
highly unpredictable times, one could speculate that the absence of time constraints may 
minimize the influence of urgency signals, while the increased demands on sustained attention 
may yield trial-to-trial fluctuations in sensory evidence that impact on the timing and 
probability of target detections [56]. 
In general, there are many different ways in which observations of decision-related neural 
signal dynamics can inform psychological process modelling and thereby help to converge on a 
computational account of the brain’s decision mechanisms [11, 28]. The most effective use of 
the neural data obviously depends on the nature of the data available, the paradigm employed, 
and the particular mechanisms being examined. In the case of Hanks et al [41], the particular 
set of stimulus conditions that was run enabled the time course of the urgency signal to be 
derived directly from the neural data and applied as a constraint in the model [57]. More 
generally the correspondence between discrete measures of neural signal dynamics (e.g. onset 
time or rate of buildup of a decision signal) and model parameters (e.g. non-decision time or 
drift rate) may not be sufficiently direct or “one-to-one” to warrant constraining the model 
parameters themselves, in which case empirical neural dynamics can be compared to simulated 
model dynamics [28].  
One powerful approach that is beginning to be employed is to quantitatively fit a given model 
to both the neural signatures of decision formation and behavioral data combined, in a single 
step [58]. This approach exploits a key benefit of neurally-informed modelling in relying on the 
additional constraints brought by neural data to allow models to take on levels of complexity 
closer to the neural reality. In cases where behavioral data alone provides sufficient constraints 
for a reasonable fit, a “two-step” approach can be taken, where behavioral fits are used to 
simulate dynamics for comparison with neural dynamics in a separate step. For example, in one 
recent study of rapid, value-biased sensorimotor decisions in humans [59], several candidate 
models invoking starting-point versus drift rate biases were first fit to behavior. As found in 
most previous studies [e.g.60, 61], a starting-point bias produced the better fit under the 
assumption of stationary (non-time-varying) drift rate. In contrast, when drift rate was instead 
assumed to increase over time within a trial to take account of the gradual nature of early 
sensory encoding processes when viewed on the timescale of very fast decisions, a drift rate 
bias provided a better fit. When evidence accumulation dynamics were simulated for all 
models, this value-biased, temporally increasing drift rate model made the unique prediction 
that neural signatures of decision formation should exhibit a 'turnaround' pattern on low-value 
sensory cues, where differential evidence is initially accumulated towards the wrong (but 
higher-value) alternative and is then dynamically re-routed towards the correct alternative. 
These very dynamics were observed in electrophysiological decision signals at both the level of 
motor preparation and motor-independent evidence accumulation. This study illustrates how 
qualitative model comparisons facilitated by electrophysiological signals tracing decision 
formation can strongly bolster the outcomes of quantitative, behavioral model comparisons  
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Neural signal analyses could similarly play a critical role in the application of models in research 
involving group comparisons. For example, consider the simple matter of choice of “scaling 
parameter” - a parameter whose value is fixed to anchor the model fit, and to set the arbitrary 
scale on which all other parameters are measured. A common choice in abstract decision 
models (e.g. DDM) is to set within-trial noise to a fixed value [62]; but what if, in reality, the 
major difference in the neural circuits of individuals with a clinical disorder is greater within-
trial noise [63]? Differences such as this could in principle be observable relatively directly 
through neural recordings, thus helping to avoid misattribution of deficits among distinct 
mechanistic elements of the decision process. 
An obvious caveat to any of the above approaches is that it must take account of how confident 
we are that the signals in question are tracing the core neural computations that give rise to 
decisions [64]. Since many brain signals (e.g. sensory and motor) are likely to be correlated in 
some way with the observer’s choices, examining signal dynamics during the period of 
deliberation and establishing a temporal relationship between those dynamics and choice 
commitment (e.g., reaction time), is an essential step to avoid an erroneous attribution of 
function. Thus, as much as with fitting of behavior alone, immediate-response paradigms that 
pinpoint the time of decision commitment provide critical constraints that enable more 
definitive model comparison [9, 34]. In addition, it is important to take account of the fact that 
the role that distinct brain areas and signals play in decision making is likely task-dependent 
(see below and Box 3).  
  
Accounting for a multi-tiered neural architecture 
  
Neurophysiological evidence from rodents, monkeys and humans is increasingly highlighting 
the multi-level nature of the brain’s neural architecture for implementing even the most 
elementary sensorimotor decisions [7, 10, 65, 66](Fig 2.). Explicitly representing each 
processing level in mathematical models may not usually be necessary to quantitatively account 
for the timing and accuracy of choice behaviour, but understanding how these distinct 
processing levels contribute to decision computations is essential if we are to develop a fuller 
systems-level understanding of the neural decision process as well as pinpointing the origins of 
decision making deficits. In some cases, behavioural effects emanating from different 
processing levels can be disentangled through experimental design. For example, a recent 
behavioural study demonstrated that choice biases arising from differences in the energetic 
cost associated with reporting each alternative, originate not at the motor level as one might 
expect, but at an upstream level of decision formation that is independent of motor effectors 
[67]. 
  
More generally, however, there are clear limits on the ability to localise effects among 
hierarchical processing levels using behavioural modeling alone. Several key parameters of 
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sequential sampling models are likely subject to influences at multiple processing levels which 
cannot be distinguished. For example, changes to the ‘non-decision time’ parameter (which 
accounts for delays due to processes not directly associated with evidence accumulation) could 
alternatively come from altered delays at the outset (e.g. sensory encoding) and/or at the end 
(e.g. motor execution) of the decision process. There is also ambiguity in a parameter’s 
dependence on changes at a single processing level versus in the transmission of information 
between levels; for example, drift rate is dependent not only on the strength and reliability of 
sensory representations themselves but also on the weighting or reference values used in 
casting those representations as an input to the accumulation process (e.g. “drift criterion” 
setting [62]). 
  
Thus, there is much to be gained from examining decision-relevant neural dynamics at each of 
the key processing levels underpinning decision formation. A key challenge for this goal is that, 
even in the case of elementary sensorimotor decisions, we do not yet know how many levels of 
processing there truly are in the computational sense. Multi-region recordings have revealed 
that choice-selective signals are rapidly transmitted across many areas[68, 69], and as one 
proceeds toward the motor end of the hierarchy, neural activity is progressively more closely 
associated with the subject's action choice rather than the stimulus features[65, 70]. But 
beyond this general principle, the distinct role played by each step of the pathway and its 
individual contribution to implementing the algorithm employed by the brain to make a given 
decision, is difficult to establish. In monkeys, for example, decision-related buildup activity with 
comparable latencies has by now been observed in LIP [71], medial intraparietal area [72] 
frontal eye field [73, 74], prefrontal cortex [75, 76], superior colliculus [77], basal ganglia [78, 
79], dorsal [80] and ventral premotor cortex [81] and primary motor cortex [42], and not 
surprisingly, many research efforts have turned to identifying the distinct contributions that 
these areas make (Box 3, Fig 2.). 
  
Non-invasive human recording techniques naturally provide a global view over all processing 
levels in tandem, though their lower resolution necessitates the use of paradigm designs and/or 
analysis methods that aim to disentangle their measurement (Box 2). Human electrophysiology 
studies have isolated two functionally distinct classes of decision signals reflecting accumulate-
to-threshold dynamics: effector-selective signals that, like signals in areas such as LIP, represent 
the translation of sensory evidence into a specific motor plan [23, 37, 82], and a domain-
general signal that builds with cumulative evidence regardless of whether responses are 
immediate, delayed or not required at all, or of the sensory feature or modality being decided 
upon [35, 83](Fig 2c). The latter supramodal, motor-independent signal, termed the 
centroparietal positivity (CPP), was also found to precede evidence-selective motor preparation 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
9 
 
signals in time [56] further suggesting that it operates at a level of processing intermediating 
between sensory encoding and motor preparation. 
  
This discovery builds on longstanding assertions that the brain must house abstract-level 
mechanisms to afford flexibility in mapping sensations to appropriate actions [84-88] by further 
suggesting that such intermediate processes can operate the way more dedicated circuits do -  
that is, by approximating an accumulation of sampled evidence towards a criterion or decision 
bound. The intracranial origins of this signal are as yet unknown. Given the similarity in 
bounded accumulation dynamics, it is tempting to link the CPP with activity in area LIP. 
However, EEG picks up neural activity globally and, since build-up activity for the selected 
alternative is mirrored by a roughly corresponding decrease in the activity of neurons coding for 
the unselected alternative, it would be expected that much or all of LIP’s choice-selective 
buildup activity would be cancelled out at the level of the scalp. Interestingly, LIP neurons have 
been found to encode goal-relevant stimulus categories (e.g. motion direction) in an effector-
independent fashion; however, it is not known whether these signals exhibit evidence 
accumulation dynamics [88]. More generally, much work remains to be done to relate 
intracranial and extracranial signals exhibiting decision-predictive dynamics in different species 
[89](Box 4). These questions notwithstanding, the identification of an abstract accumulation 
process in human brain recordings highlights the existence of an additional processing layer 
whose precise role in decision formation remains to be determined. 
  
Although we may lack a complete picture of the essential computational layers for decision 
making, studies that have recorded neural activity at multiple processing levels during the same 
task have already furnished insights that are beyond the reach of behavioural modelling alone. 
For example, recording from both MT and LIP during training on a motion direction 
discrimination task revealed that improvements in behavioural sensitivity with learning were 
attributable to changes in the motion-driven response of LIP neurons in the absence of any 
change in the evidence-encoding MT neurons, suggesting that learning changes the read-out 
but not the sensory representations themselves[90].  
 
In certain instances, multiple levels of processing can be examined within a single brain area. 
For example, in the context of visual search decisions, salience encoding visual FEF neurons 
provide the evidence that is accumulated by movement neurons, and these signals have also 
been used to directly constrain mathematical models [27, 29, 47]. One such study examined the 
impact of speed/accuracy emphasis in visual search on processing at these distinct levels [47]. 
Despite the fact that behavioural data fits of a popular bounded accumulation model (linear 
ballistic accumulator, Box 1) indicated no difference in drift rate, speed pressure was found to 
enhance evidence encoding in visual FEF.  Meanwhile, evidence accumulating movement 
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neurons exhibited a complex pattern of adjustments that were not predicted by any pre-
existing decision model, including increased activity levels at the time of saccade execution 
under greater speed pressure. The authors went on to construct a multi-level model that could 
accommodate this seemingly paradoxical finding by positing an additional leaky integration 
step carried out by brainstem neurons known to exhibit a threshold-crossing relationship with 
saccade execution and to receive direct projections from movement neurons of the FEF. This 
model provided as good a fit to the behavioural data as the standard model while also 
capturing key qualitative features of the measured FEF activity including increased buildup rate 
in the visual neurons under speed emphasis. This study serves to highlight that, while abstract 
decision models can provide parsimonious accounts of choice behaviour, they may not 
necessarily capture all of the mechanistic steps that the brain performs and are therefore not 
always likely to correspond with neurophysiological dynamics observed at any one processing 
level. It also illustrates how models built from physiological knowledge of sensorimotor systems 
and their capabilities can play a pivotal role in facilitating the interpretation of decision-related 
neural activity patterns (Box 4).  
  
Complementing computational modelling with neural recordings probing multiple processing 
levels (e.g., sensory evidence encoding, motor-independent accumulation, motor preparation 
and muscle activation) will be central to resolving a range of outstanding questions in the field. 
For example, thus far, neurophysiological research examining the impact on decision making of 
key factors such as speed pressure, prior probability and payoff information has mainly 
focussed on activity in neural circuits situated close to the motor output end of the 
sensorimotor hierarchy. Yet, research on attention [91], feature expectation [92] and reward 
expectation [93, 94] has demonstrated the capacity of the brain to exert top-down influences 
on basic sensory representations. We do not know to what extent such modulations are 
employed when adapting decision processes to account for contextual factors, and modelling 
studies rarely consider their potential computational benefits. The signals and techniques are 
now available for us to begin to answer these questions and, in any such endeavour, 
computational models can play an essential role in linking neural activity to the distinct 
algorithmic elements of decision formation. 
  
  
Concluding Remarks 
  
Sequential sampling models have provided a common, principled foundation to diverse 
investigations into decision making. Behavioral fits of the models have long been used to 
furnish meaningful, mechanistically-defined metrics to aid in understanding differences in how 
decisions are forged across stimulus conditions, task contexts and clinical groups. However, the 
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field has been grappling with a number of debates regarding key algorithmic elements of these 
models that are difficult or impossible to resolve based solely on quantitative fits to behavioural 
data. The newfound ability to observe neural signal dynamics underpinning the decision 
process provides a new means of guiding model development and recent studies demonstrate 
the unique insights that can be acquired by examining correspondences between abstract 
mathematical models and neurophysiological observations.  Depending on the availability of 
neural signals that definitively reflect elements of decision formation, it is possible to construct 
models that are neurally-constrained (e.g. quantitatively setting a time-varying stopping 
criterion based directly on neural measurements), neurally-informed (e.g., including and fitting 
parameters for time-varying criterion settings based on qualitative patterns observed in the 
neural data), or at least neurally-cognizant (e.g., including and fitting a time-varying criterion 
based on pre-existing neurophysiological evidence for its general role). With the ongoing 
development of techniques and paradigms for measuring decision-relevant neural processes, 
we can expect to see increasing adoption of such approaches that integrate neural evidence 
into computational accounts of decision making (see Outstanding Questions). Adapting 
cognitive models to reflect the critical neural dynamics governing decision formation can also 
help substantially in establishing much needed linkages between the parameters and 
mechanisms of cognitive models and biophysically-based neural circuit models, which are rarely 
brought into direct contact [95](Box 4). The conceptual and methodological challenges 
examined in this review have implications that extend beyond research on perceptual decision 
making as a trend toward integrating computational models and neural data is increasingly 
evident in many other research fields [96, 97]. 
  
  
  
  
  
Box 1. Sequential sampling models: Different flavours for different research objectives 
Over the years, several decision model variants have been developed based on the core 
principles of sequential sampling and bounded evidence accumulation. In standard, one-
dimensional diffusion models, for example, a sequence of samples from a Gaussian distribution 
representing noisy sensory evidence with, say, mean µ∆t (“drift rate”) and variance ∆t, is 
accumulated until the cumulant reaches an upper or lower bound. The drift rate scales with 
stimulus strength and the bounds are set to achieve a balance between speed and accuracy 
demands. A “non-decision” time is included to account for additional delays associated with 
encoding, routing [98] and/or motor execution processes, independent of the diffusion process 
itself. In a popular, versatile version of this model, it is extended to include random trial-to-trial 
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variability in starting point, drift rate and non-decision time, which provides significant flexibility 
to capture relatively fast or slow errors and specific RT distribution shapes [62]. 
More or less complex versions of this model are employed depending on research goals. In 
general, cognitive modeling is principally concerned with forging abstract mathematical 
accounts of behavior whose parameters serve as mechanistically interpretable metrics of task 
performance, and differs from neural modeling in not striving to represent details of 
neurophysiological implementation [99]. Several reduced models have been developed to 
achieve this with computational ease, for example by excluding trial-to-trial variability 
parameters, where the relative speed of error responses is not critical [100], or by excluding the 
within-trial noise parameter (“ballistic,” racing accumulators [101, 102]). 
Toward the more complex end, the leaky competing accumulator model of Usher and 
McClelland [103] parameterizes both the degree of competition between alternative 
accumulators and the leak of information within them, which provides one way to explain 
limited improvements in accuracy with longer viewing durations. Cortical microcircuit models 
have been developed which reproduce complex dynamical aspects of neural buildup patterns 
as well as decision behavior [38, 104], and incorporate well-known motor control circuits such 
as the basal ganglia [105]. An ongoing challenge is to determine how the elements of these 
sometimes very complex circuit models relate in straightforward terms to the parameters of 
the abstract models. Although cognitive modeling and neural modeling have ostensibly distinct 
goals, there is valuable but under-exploited territory at the interface between them, where 
models could capture key elements of neural implementation at distinct levels of the 
sensorimotor hierarchy as well as detailed behavioral trends. 
  
  
  
  
  
Box 2 Probing Decision-related neural activity in Non-Invasive Recordings 
  
Significant advances in isolating decision signals from noninvasive human brain recordings open 
up possibilities for translating the detailed characterisations of decision mechanisms wrought 
from non-human neurophysiology to the human brain in both health and disease. Moreover, 
global brain recording techniques like electro-/magneto-encephalography (EEG/MEG) and fMRI 
can complement intracranial investigations by offering a unique systems-level view over 
processes underlying decisions of a wider range of complexity. A challenge, however, is that 
noninvasive assays suffer from poor resolution. In EEG/MEG, signals at the scalp reflect the sum 
of all concurrently active components of neural activity. Several approaches have been 
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employed to disentangle the components specifically playing a role in decision making. One 
approach is to design paradigms that by their nature produce signals related to the core 
ingredients for a decision (sensory evidence, its accumulation over time, and emergent motor 
preparation) while minimising decision-irrelevant neural activity components. For example, 
decisions based on gradual changes in the intensity of flickering visual or auditory stimuli 
readily furnish sensory evidence signals through steady-state flicker-response amplitudes and 
eliminate irrelevant early sensory-evoked potentials normally evoked by sudden intensity 
transients [35]. This allows observation of decision formation dynamics relatively directly 
without imposing any constraints on the form they should take. The downside is that the 
approach works best for very elementary decisions. 
Other approaches have used signal-analytic methods to extract decision-relevant signals during 
more complex tasks involving higher-order categorizations. For example, using a task requiring 
accumulation of orientation information varying stochastically over discrete sequential 
samples, sample-by-sample regression analyses can furnish distinct signal components related 
to decision-irrelevant sensory changes and relevant decision-update processes [106, 107]. 
Another approach uses multivariate classification algorithms to derive functionally-defined EEG 
components that, like the observers themselves, discriminate between blurred images of high-
level objects such as cars and faces [36]. Significant promise lies in combining the above 
paradigm-design and analytic approaches. 
For the above noninvasive neurophysiology approaches, the ability to take measurements of 
dynamic decision signals at multiple hierarchical levels in the decision architecture has been 
demonstrated, yet the potential to use such measurements in neurally-informed, or even 
neurally-constrained, modeling is only beginning to be realised [23]. Joint neural-behavioral 
model fitting can also be done in a more data-driven manner, without necessarily singling-out 
signals independently verified to reflect decision formation dynamics. This is best exemplified in 
neuroimaging research. Although limitations in temporal resolution preclude measurement of 
dynamics, brain-wide BOLD activations can be used as constraints in model fits [108] and play a 
vital role in identifying candidate decision-related brain structures for potential follow-up in 
intracranial investigations. 
  
Box 3 Causal Inference 
  
Much research effort in decision neuroscience has been focussed on recordings from area LIP 
and this work has yielded insights into the computational mechanisms by which the brain 
accommodates speed-accuracy demands [41], prior biases [109], multiple alternatives [40], 
switching between alternate evidence dimensions [110], and other problems regularly faced by 
real decision makers. As these insights have amassed, so also has the misconception that such 
findings imply that LIP’s central function is to accumulate evidence for decisions. This is of course 
misguided. LIP simply contains neurons whose properties, characterized over decades of careful 
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research into saccadic target selection [111, 112] make it possible to study transformations 
common to many decisions when experimental conditions are carefully contrived to render those 
neurons informative (e.g., when the decisions are based on simple feature discriminations and 
choices are reported via saccades towards or away from targets placed within the receptive field 
of the recorded neuron). Moreover, these studies typically record from a subset of LIP neurons 
that exhibit sustained firing during delay periods prior to saccade execution on the grounds that 
they are best equipped to trace a temporally extended decision process. Step outside of these 
conditions and the choice-relevant dynamics observed in LIP can change significantly. For 
example, in the context of visual search, neural signatures of evidence accumulation are 
observed in the frontal eye field [47, 73] while LIP activity has been linked more with the 
representation of salience as the core ‘evidence’ on which the search decision is based [113, 114]. 
Even in the case of motion discrimination, LIP is only one of many areas carrying functionally 
similar evidence accumulation signals [e.g. 72], and may not necessarily play any role in most 
decisions faced by the animal in its daily life. Indeed, across a range of tasks involving saccadic 
choices, inactivation of LIP and rodent PPC has varying, task-dependent impact but is never 
devastating to performance[e.g. 115, 116-119]. As was stated at the outset of this line of work 
[31], the build-to-threshold dynamics in LIP do not in themselves suggest that decisions are 
formed in LIP, but rather that LIP can provide a window onto decision processes and the 
computations they implement regardless of where the decision is initiated. 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Box 4 Bridging across recording modalities in decision neuroscience 
  
The neural bases of decision making have now been studied at a range of functional levels and 
scales running from single neurons, through neuronal microcircuits, to global activity measured 
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in human electrophysiology/neuroimaging. With these expanding viewpoints comes the 
imperative to integrate findings across these levels, and an obvious part must be played by 
research on the biophysical translations between recording modalities. For example, in bridging 
from the neuronal circuit level to noninvasive electrophysiology, local field potential (LFP) activity 
and its relationship with multi-unit spiking forms an important bridge to scalp EEG, which mainly 
reflects postsynaptic activity [120]. Such research has indeed been increasingly undertaken 
recently at both the sensory level [e.g. 121] and the level of emerging action plans [e.g. 122], and 
biophysical mechanisms by which extracellular LFPs translate to electric/magnetic signals at the 
scalp surface [e.g. 123] and to BOLD activations [e.g. 124] remain active areas of investigation. 
  
Biophysically-based computational modeling represents a complementary, powerful approach 
to integrating across levels of description while also specifying mechanisms of decision 
formation. For instance, spiking neuronal network models have successfully captured aspects of 
spiking dynamics and behavioral data during decision making (Wang, 2002). More recently, it has 
been found that through training, such recurrent neural networks can capture various 
idiosyncracies found in neuronal population recordings such as mixed, time-varying and 
heterogeneous selectivity, across a variety of decision-making tasks [125-127]. Such models 
reveal an additional layer of complexity of neural computation in decision-making, which may 
not be accomplished using simplified cognitive models. 
  
Despite this progress, recurrent neural networks come with issues relating to stability and ease 
of interpretation with respect to decision algorithms of lower complexity. One means to bridge  
from spiking neuronal network models to simpler firing-rate, population-based models is through 
theoretical mean-field approximations [104, 128], but the application of this approach to 
heterogeneous networks is still in its infancy. Achieving a principled mapping of complex network 
models to lower-dimensional descriptions is vital in order to make linkages to the reduced 
cognitive models in widespread use in decision science [95], and has huge implications for model-
based analyses in neuroimaging given the already prevalent reliance on neural mass models (e.g. 
dynamic causal modelling) to understand causal global brain dynamics [129], including in 
perceptual decision making [130, 131]. 
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Glossary 
Evidence Accumulation: According to sequential sampling models, accurate perceptual 
decisions can be achieved in the face of sensory noise by repeatedly sampling and integrating 
independent samples of evidence and withholding commitment until a predefined quantity has 
accrued in favour of one of the decision alternatives. There are multiple possible ways that this 
general process can be implemented both mathematically and neurophysiologically. 
Model Parsimony: Mathematical decision models have traditionally been evaluated using 
statistical methods that balance a model’s ability to account for observed behaviour against its 
complexity. Evaluation methods that consider fits to neural as well as behavioural data are 
needed to facilitate the development of more detailed models that can account for the neural 
implementation of the decision process. 
Neural decision signal: A neural signal that traces the process of decision formation. Typically, 
the term is used to distinguish neural computations that are tied solely to the choice outcome 
from sensory responses that exhibit trial-to-trial correlations with choice behaviour (see 
‘Sensory Evidence Signal’ below). Here, we use the term primarily to refer to neural 
representation of accumulated evidence supporting decision formation). Single-unit and non-
invasive electrophysiological recording studies have isolated signals exhibiting evidence 
accumulation dynamics that account for the timing and accuracy of the observer’s perceptual 
reports. The ability to directly observe and measure such signals opens new avenues for 
adjudicating between alternative decision models and developing new models that reflect the 
neural implementation of the decision process as well as its output. 
Neurally-informed modeling: The practice of basing model construction or constraining model 
parameters using qualitative and/or quantitative observations from empirical neural data. This 
approach contrasts with model-informed neuroscience approaches in which an existing model 
is leveraged to furnish mechanistically-defined behavioral metrics for correlation with neural 
data. For a comprehensive review of the distinct approaches to integrating mathematical and 
neurophysiological characterisations of decision making see [11, 64]. 
Sensory Evidence Signal: A signal that reflects the sensory input to a perceptual decision. Any 
stimulus will elicit a range of sensory signals, many of which may be irrelevant to the task at 
hand. The key distinguishing characteristics of a sensory evidence signal are that its momentary 
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level should co-vary with a decision-relevant stimulus variable and its activity should predict 
choice behaviour in a stimulus-independent manner (also known as ‘choice probability’). 
Urgency Signal: An evidence-independent component of neural decision signal activity that 
expedites choice commitment. Such signals can be accommodated in mathematical models as a 
dynamic adjustment to the quantity of evidence required to trigger commitment (i.e. a 
collapsing decision bound). The recent identification of urgency signals that grow as a function 
of deliberation time challenges the dominant view in the mathematical modelling literature 
that, once adjusted, decision bounds remain fixed for the duration of a decision. 
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Figure 1. (A) Schematic illustrating how drift rate variability with static bounds can produce 
slow errors. Solid lines indicate the path taken by a diffusion decision variable on each of two 
example single trials, one resulting in a correct response (green) and one resulting in an 
erroneous (orange) choice. Dotted lines mark the drift rate for each of those two trials. (B) 
Schematic illustrating how collapsing bounds without drift rate variability can alternatively 
produce slow errors. Again two example single trials are shown, in this case arising from the 
same, fixed drift rate (C) Conditional accuracy functions illustrating the decrease in accuracy as 
a function of response time (RT). Blue and red lines represent data from two different task 
conditions emphasizing accuracy and speed respectively. Data from Murphy et al [23] (D) LIP 
firing rate data highlighting that speed emphasis leads to an increase in the starting level of 
activity at trial onset and also an evidence-independent acceleration of signal build-up over 
time, reflecting a dynamic urgency component whose impact is equivalent to a collapsing 
bound (B). Data from Hanks et al [41]   
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Figure 2. A multiplicity of decision signals. (Left Column) Top, when monkeys indicate motion 
direction discrimination decisions via saccade, neurons in area LIP exhibit accumulation-to-
bound dynamics that are highly sensitive to variations in sensory evidence. Here, LIP neuron 
firing rates increase more rapidly when coherent motion more strongly favours a saccade to a 
target located within the neuron’s response field (Tin). Although a great many intracranial 
recording studies of perceptual decision making have targeted area LIP, highly similar neural 
decision signals have been observed in a variety of other regions of the monkey brain. Middle, 
when monkeys make reach movements to indicate their decisions, instead of saccades, reach-
related neurons in the medial intraparietal area (MIP) exhibit highly similar accumulate-to-
bound dynamics (solid traces . Bottom, movement neurons in FEF exhibit evidence 
accumulation dynamics during visual search decisions reported via saccade. Thin lines represent 
trials on which a distractor appeared within the neuron’s response field (Tout). Data from 
Roitman & Shadlen [34]; De Lafuente et al [72]; Purcell et al [29].  (Middle Column) When 
rodents performed an auditory decision task, evidence accumulation dynamics are observed in 
(top) posterior parietal cortex (PPC) and (middle) frontal orienting fields (FOF). However, tuning 
curve analyse (bottom) indicate that while PPC provides a graded representation of incoming 
evidence, momentary FOF activity reflects the currently favoured alternative in a more 
categorical fashion. This pattern accords with the general observation from multi-site recording 
studies that neural activity becomes progressively more closely linked to the observer’s action 
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choices as one proceeds toward the motor end of the sensorimotor hierarchy. Data from Hanks 
et al [7] (Right Column) When humans make motion discrimination decisions, highly similar 
accumulate-to-threshold signals are observed in non-invasive electrophysiological recordings.  
This work has uncovered two functionally distinct classes of decision signal: Top, when 
observer’s indicate their decisions via hand movement, contralateral motor preparation signals 
trace decision formation. These signals cease to trace decision formation if the stimulus-to-
response mapping is withheld or when hand movements are not required. Middle, a centro-
parietal positive (CPP) component in the event-related potential also traces evidence 
accumulation but does so irrespective of the sensory or motor requirements of the task. 
Bottom, when participants withheld motion direction decision reports until the appearance of a 
response cue (1600ms after stimulus onset). The CPP traced decision formation irrespective of 
whether the participant had foreknowledge of the stimulus-to-response mapping (Fixed 
Mapping) or not (Variable Mapping) and fell silent only when dot motion was rendered 
irrelevant to the task (ignore motion). Data from Kelly & O’Connell [132], Twomey et al [83] 
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Highlights 
 
● Sequential sampling models have been widely embraced in contemporary decision 
neuroscience. The models come in many forms that, despite containing fundamentally 
different algorithmic elements, can make highly similar predictions for behaviour. 
Consequently, it can be difficult to definitively adjudicate between alternative models 
based solely on quantitative fits to behaviour. 
● The discovery of brain signals that reflect the key neural computations underpinning 
decision making is opening new avenues for empirically testing and refining model 
predictions. 
● Neurophysiological research is highlighting the multi-layered neural architecture for 
implementing even the most elementary sensorimotor decisions. We do not yet know 
how many processing layers are required nor what distinct computations are perform 
at each layer. 
 
Highlights
Outstanding Questions Box  
 
 Can neural signal analyses be used to determine whether sequential sampling 
models provide accurate accounts of the essential neurocomputational adjustments 
through which factors such as prior information, conflicting information, redundant 
information, energetic costs, spatial attention, perceptual learning, value and brain 
disorders influence decision making behaviour? In addition to dominant criterion 
adjustments are there modulations exerted at the sensory level that model fitting 
alone cannot detect? 
 
 The versatility of popular sequential sampling model variants is partly owed to the 
inclusion of certain parameters (e.g. variability in drift rate and starting point) that 
greatly aid the flexibility with which the models can account for different behavioural 
patterns. What predictions do these parameters make regarding neural activity and 
how can these predictions be tested? Can neural signatures of such processes be 
identified?    
 
 Build-to-threshold decision signals have been observed in a variety of brain areas. 
What distinct computations do these signals and areas perform during decision 
formation?  
 
 What precise role do abstract evidence accumulation signals play in decision 
formation? How do non-invasively recorded human brain decision signals relate to 
the signals observed in single-unit activity in monkeys and rodents?  
 
Outstanding Questions
